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An Overview of Commercial Mortgage Backed Securitization:
The Devil Is in the Details
I. INTRODUcTION
"Commercial real estate is income-producing properties that are
managed for economic profit,"' such as apartments, shopping centers,
hotels, restaurants, warehouses, and offices.2 It is estimated that an
excess of one trillion dollars in outstanding loans is secured by com-
mercial real estate.3 Commercial real estate lending is the latest
financing arrangement to use securitization as an alternative financ-
ing structure.
Securitization is the process by which financial assets that gener-
ate a cash flow, such as home mortgages, automobile loans, credit
card receivables, tax liens, or commercial real estate loans, are con-
verted into securities in order to gain access to the capital markets.4
Securitization takes illiquid assets and transforms them into market-
able securities.5 The securities issued can be either stocks (equity) or
bonds (debt).6 Like most securities, the securities offered through
securitization are transferable, and the only limitation on transfer-
ability is the development and activity of the secondary market.!
Through the use of securitization, banks continue to play a dominate
role in commercial real estate lending while shifting the risk of com-
1. David P. Jacob & Kimbell R. Duncan, Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities,
in THE HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES 491, 491 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed.,
4th ed. 1995).
2. See id.
3. See David S. Schaeffer, A Jump-Start for the Mortgage-Backed Market?, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 24, 1995, at 38.
4. See David Alan Richards, "Gradable and Tradable": The Securitization of Com-
mercial Real Estate Mortgages, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 99 (1987); see also Joseph C. Shenke &
Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitizatiow Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69
TEx. L. REV. 1369, 1373-74 (1991).
5. See Franklin D. Sreyer, Statements to Congress, 77 FED. RES. BULL. 726, 726
(1991); see also Shenke & Colletta, supra note 4, at 1373-74.
6. See Shenke & Colletta, supra note 4, at 1374-75. The needs of the institution
offering the security and the acceptance on the marketplace will help determine the type
of security instrument offered.
7. See id- at 1373. A secondary market is created by the trading of securities be-
tween the owners of the securities who are not the issuers and the third party purchasers
(who could be the issuers of the security).
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mercial real estate loans to third party investors.
Commercial Mortgaged Backed Securitization (CMBS) is the
merging of traditional commercial real estate financing and asset
backed structured financing.8 CMBS combines the tools of real es-
tate law with the instruments of securities law.9 In a commercial real
estate securitization conduit, a number of mortgages are originated,"
pooled, and sold to a special purpose vehicle (SPV)." Once the loans
are pooled, a national rating agency evaluates the investment risk of
the pool.'2 The SPV then divides the pool into separate classes. 3
Once the pool is divided into the separate classes, the SPV sells an
interest in the classes to third party investors. 4
Three primary advantages to securitization exist. First, securiti-
zation offers access to investment capital that was traditionally
unavailable.'5 Second, securitization reduces bankruptcy risk by seg-
regating the assets securitized from the entity originating the asset.
16
Third, securitization offers flexibility to the issuer by allowing the in-
clusion of assets that have different cash flow and maturity
characteristics. 7
However, there are three significant criticisms of securitization.
First, the creditors of the originating entity lose valuable assets if that
entity goes into bankruptcy.'Y Second, the structures of the transac-
tion are so complex that an investor may be unaware of all the
potential risks involved with such an investment. 9 Finally, as a cor-
ollary to the complexity of the transaction, the investor may not fully
8. See Richards, supra note 4, at 122.
9. See id.
10. See infra notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 216-44 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 187-95 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 113-47 and accompanying text.
15. See Structured Financing Techniques, 50 Bus. LAW. 528, 530-31 (1995); see also
John C. Cody, Comment, The Dysfunctional "Family Resemblance" Test: After Reves v.
Ernst & Young, When are Mortgage Notes "Securities"?, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 761, 764
(1994). The creation of a secondary market assisted in eliminating the mismatch between
lenders' supply of mortgage funds and the demand by borrowers for those funds. See iL;
see also Richards, supra note 4, at 103.
16. See Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 15, at 530. For further discus-
sion, see infra notes 216-44 and accompanying text.
17. See id. at 531. Cash flow means the amount of cash the asset generates. Maturity
characteristics generally deal with the scheduled end of the cash flow of the asset.
18. See id. at 535-36.
19. See id. at 536.
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understand the role of the national rating agencies, such as Standard
and Poor's and Moody's Investors Services, and the reliance of the
rating agencies on legal opinion to establish the security's rating."
Despite these criticisms, securitization has become a valuable al-
ternative financing source in commercial real estate lending.
Securitization is a method of financing that meets the needs of both
the asset originator and the investor, and as such, it will continue to
expand as a financing alternative. However, the devil of CMBS is in
the details.
This Comment exorcises the devil. First, this Comment explores
the origins of securitization as a form of financing and the Resolution
Trust Corporation's (RTC) role in the rise of CMBS.2' Further, this
Comment explores the basic structure of CMBS transactions from
both the origination component and the securities component.'
Next, this Comment discusses the challenges that faced the viability
of the CMBS market and the market response to those challenges.'
This Comment will also look at the participation of North Carolina
banks in the CMBS market. Specifically, this Comment will investi-
gate how First Union National Bank (First Union)' and
NationsBank, N.A. (NationsBank) 6 integrate CMBS into their com-
mercial real estate lending strategies. In addition, this Comment will
evaluate the investment strategies of Branch Banking & Trust Com-
pany (BB&T), Central Carolina Bank & Trust Company (CCB),
Centura Bank Company (Centura) and Wachovia National Bank &
Trust Company (Wachovia) to determine if commercial mortgage
backed securities are part of their investment portfolio and the rea-
sons for that decision.27  Finally, this Comment concludes by
identifying specific economic or legal factors that will greatly impact
the future of CMBS.'
20. See id.
21. See infra notes 29-94 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 113-47 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 148-244 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 246-50 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 251-57 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 258-64 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 265 and accompanying text.
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II. ORIGINS OF SECURITIZATION
With the advent of mortgage insurance programs at the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) in 1934 and the Veterans Admini-
stration (VA) in 1944, Congress created a mechanism to insure
lenders against residential mortgage defaults.29 These loan insurance
programs had a profound effect on home mortgage lending." The
ability of lenders to seek recourse against either the FHA or the VA
if a borrower defaulted on a home mortgage increased lender confi-
dence, which increased the possibility of individual homeownership.3'
Furthermore, these programs led to lower down payment require-
ments and longer term fixed rate mortgages sought by purchasers.32
All of these factors made homeownership more accessible to poten-
tial homebuyers.33
Congress then created the Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion (FNMA or Fannie Mae) to purchase FHA-insured and VA-
guaranteed loans from lenders' portfolios, thereby creating the nec-
essary liquidity to encourage lenders to increase residential mortgage
lending.' In 1968, FNMA split into two distinct entities. 5 The first
entity became a federally chartered corporation owned by private
shareholders.' This entity continued to be called the Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Association.37  The second entity was the
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA or Ginnie
Mae), which became a federal agency within the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD).38 Fannie Mae concen-
trated its efforts on the buying and selling of FHA and VA loans,
29. See Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market-A Catalyst for Change
in Real Estate Transactions, 39 Sw. L.J. 991, 992 (1986).
30. See id.
31. See id
32. See id
33. See id A potential purchaser who is required to put less money down as a deposit
for the purchase of a home is able, therefore, to purchase a home more quickly, with less
time required to save for a downpayment. Furthermore, longer terms on a fixed rate
mortgage and a lower periodic payment allow the purchaser to manage her finances in
such a way as to make the purchase of a home more affordable. Finally, the lender as-
sumes very little risk because the FHA or the VA guarantees the loan in the event of a
borrower's default. This allows the lender to ease its lending requirements so that an
otherwise unqualified borrower might now qualify for a loan.
34. See id. at 992-93.
35. See id at 993.
36. See id
37. See id
38. See id
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while Ginnie Mae was responsible for the government's special assis-
tance and housing support programs.39 In 1970, Congress created the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie
Mac) with the primary goal of purchasing conventional residential
mortgage loans.' The availability of capital created liquidity in the
home mortgage market, which allowed an active secondary market to
develop. Uniform lending standards were created for the home
mortgage industry due to the continuing development of a sophisti-
cated secondary market.42
The size of the active secondary market allowed for the devel-
opment of new and creative financing techniques. The pooling of
residential home mortgages and the offering of securities supported
by the pool was the beginning of securitization as an effective fi-
nancing mechanism.43 In 1970, GNMA issued the first publicly traded
residential mortgage backed securities.' These securities were modi-
fied pass-through certificates that represented an undivided
ownership in a fixed pool of FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed residen-
tial mortgages.45 The undivided interests in the pool were held by a
grantor trust for the benefit of pass-through certificate holders.46 The
cash flowing from the underlying mortgages was "passed through"
from the trust to the security holder monthly on a pro rata basis."
GNMA, using the full faith and credit of the United States as a credit
support, guaranteed to its investors the full and timely payment of
principal and interest.' The Ginnie Mae offerings were soon fol-
39. See id. at 993-94.
40. See id. at 994. In the statute, conventional loans are those loans that are neither
FHA insured nor VA guaranteed in the event of borrower default. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id Uniformity resulted in the standardization of the mortgage documents
that are used for home loan transactions. Thus, the purchaser of loans from the lender or
loan originator would not acquire a portfolio of loans with varying terms. This standardi-
zation allowed the investor to evaluate the risk of the portfolio as a whole, thereby
furthering the development of the secondary market.
43. See Richards, supra note 4, at 102.
44. See Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 15, at 537.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 15, at 537; see also Richards,
supra note 4, at 104. In the event of default by any of the mortgagors of the mortgages in
the fixed pool, GNMA was obligated to pay the principal and interest to investors. See
Richards, supra note 4, at 104.
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lowed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac offerings. 9
Another financing structure that developed was "mortgage-
backed bonds" (MBBs).' MBBs are general obligations of the issuer
in which the issuer keeps the cash flows of the underlying mortgages,
and in which the cash flows are not specifically used to pay the bond
obligations." Instead, the obligations of the bonds are paid from the
issuer's general fund.' MBB issuers greatly overcollaterized the
bonds in order to attract a more favorable rating, thus allowing the
issuer to pay lower interest rates to the bondholders.53
A hybrid of the pass-through certificate and MBBs was created
with the pay-through bond.- Using the best aspects of both the pass-
through certificates and mortgage-backed bonds, pay-through bonds
linked the interest and principal income of the underlying mortgage
pool to the bonds' interest payment obligation.55 The default risk of
the underlying mortgages collateralizing the pool remained with the
issuer. 6 Pay-through bonds enabled the issuer to liquidate low-
yielding loans without having to write off a capital loss, since the is-
suer retained ownership of the mortgage collateralizing the bond.
In 1983, Freddie Mac offered the next generation of mortgage
backed security, the collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO)"
The CMO is a pay-through bond divided into multiple classes or
tranches59 that have different maturities.: CMOs provide an investor
with the opportunity to pick short, intermediate, or long-term maturi-
ties."l Earlier maturity dates offer the investor lower interest rate
yields due to the lower long term interest rate risky. Interest pay-
ments are made to each tranche, but the principal is repaid to each
49. See Richards, supra note 4, at 104.
50. See id. at 106.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See iL at 107.
54. See L
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 108.
59. Taken from the French word "tranche," which means "slice." In this context, a
tranche is a class of debt securities issued as part of a single debt offering. See BARRON'S
DICrIONARY OF BANKING TERMS 629 (2d ed. 1993).
60. See Richards, supra note 4, at 108.
61. See id.
62. See id.
1997]
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tranche in succession based on the corresponding maturity. 3 The
principal is first repaid to the earliest maturing tranche, and once that
tranche is fully repaid, the succeeding tranche begins to receive its
principal repayment." However, the exception to this payment
schedule is the "Z" tranche. The "Z" tranche, generally the last
tranche, receives no interest or principal payment until all the pre-
ceding tranches are fully repaid.5 The "Z" tranche is in reality a
Zero Coupon Bond 6'
The successful securitization of residential mortgages led to the
securitization of non-mortgage assets.67 Early non-mortgage asset
securitization centered on commercial paper.8 However, the market
changed significantly in 1985 when the Sperry Corporation (Sperry)
issued lease-backed notes.69 In this transaction, Sperry first created a
subsidiary to serve as an entity solely for this securitization transac-
tion. This entity is called a special purpose vehicle (SPV).7" Sperry
then sold its computer operating leases to the SPV, which in turn is-
sued fixed rate notes backed by the pledges of the leases.2 The cash
flow generated by the computer operating leases paid the principal
and interest obligations of the notes. 3 The notes offered through the
SPV were rated higher than the debt obligations issued by the
Sperry.'
Soon, other types of receivables were converted into securities.
Marine Midland Bank and Valley National Bank began securitizing
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 108.
66. See id. The holder of a zero coupon bond receives a lump sum payment at ma-
turity. The bond is sold at a steep discount from its face value because it absorbs the first
loss related to the investment. See BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF BANKING TERMS 690 (2d
ed. 1993). If a borrower is in default, any loss accruing to the investor is first assigned to
the holder of the zero coupon bond. Due to the uncertainty of the potential losses in the
mortgage pool, the investor pays a steep discount for the bond as a way to potentially
receive greater return on a risky investment.
67. See Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 15, at 538.
68. Commercial paper is a short term promissory note that matures between two days
and 270 days from the date of issuing. See BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT TERMS 96 (4th ed. 1995).
69. See Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 15, at 538.
70. See icL
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
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automobile loans." They were soon followed by General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corporation, Chrysler Financial Corporation, and Nissan
Motor Acceptance Corporation.76 In 1987, Bank of America and Re-
publicBank of Delaware offered credit card receivable-backed
securities.' Through the late 1980s and into the 1990s, "the list of
assets that have been securitized has grown to include municipal
leases, mobile home loans, boat loans, non-performing loans, home
equity loans, health care receivables, student loans,.., recreational
equipment leases," and timber collateralized obligations, as well as
other assets.6
III. THE ROLE OF THE RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION IN THE
CREATION OF CMBS
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, traditional providers of debt
capital for commercial real estate, such as thrift institutions, banks,
and insurance companies, reduced their participation in the financing
of commercial real estate due to business considerations or regula-
tory constraints.79 This reduction on the part of traditional lenders
created an opportunity for the capital markets to provide financing
for commercial real estate transactionsl In 1984, Olympia & York, a
real estate developer, issued a $970 million securitization of three of-
fice buildings in New York.6 ' This started the use of securitization as
a financing mechanism for commercial real estate." However, it was
the involvement of the RTC that created the momentum for CMBS.
As the RTC took over more failed thrift institutions, it was faced
with the issue of what to do with its ever-increasing inventory of
commercial real estate assets.' The RTC's commercial real estate
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 539.
79. See Jacob & Duncan, supra note 1, at 492.
80. See id.
81. See GREGORY A. WHITE, "SLICING AND DICING" A REVIEW OF COMMERCIAL
MORTGAGED-BACKED SECURITIES AND THEIR ROLE IN A PENSION FUND'S IN-
VESTMENT PORTFOLIO 1 (Schroder Mortgage Associates 1994); JULIA C. PARKS ET AL.,
EXPLORING COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES IN A PENSION FUND
PORTFOLIO 7 (Heitman/JMB Advisory Corp. 1995).
82. See WHITE, supra note 81, at 1; see also PARKS ET AL., supra note 81, at 7.
83. See Jacob & Duncan, supra note 1, at 492.
84. Brian A. Ciochetti & Timothy J. Riddiough, Understanding Commercial Mort-
gage Securitization and Its Impact on Debt Financing for Retail Centers, 3 J. SHOPPING
1997]
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inventory contained both performing and non-performing mort-
gages.' The RTC determined that the best course of action was to
sell all of its inventory of assets.' A question then arose as to how to
sell these assets.' The RTC did not deem traditional auctions a vi-
able alternative because the perceived deflated value of the
commercial real estate assets might have led to correspondingly low
bidding by "vulture" investors." This would have resulted in a lower
return for the RTC and a greater loss for the taxpayers. This situa-
tion was further exacerbated by the fact that insurance companies,
traditionally large commercial real estate lenders, would not partici-
pate in RTC auctions.'o Although an active secondary market for
commercial real estate mortgages was previously non-existent, the
RTC determined that securitization of its commercial real estate
mortgages was the preferred way to dispose of its inventory.9' The
RTC securitized its inventory by pooling large numbers of commer-
cial mortgages and selling these as securities to the public markets.'
By July 1993, the RTC had securitized close to $14 billion of com-
mercial mortgages.
With the tightening lending environment, the RTC's large inven-
tory, and the success of previous securitization efforts Wall Street
found an unusual opportunity to become an alternative source of
commercial real estate financing.94 In the process, a viable secondary
market for commercial real estate mortgage securities was created
and CMBS became a reality.
IV. LOAN TRANSACTION
The structure of securitized commercial real estate loan transac-
tions generally looks like other commercial real estate loan
CENTER RES. 49,65 (1996).
85. See id A performing mortgage is one in which the borrower has, to date, fulfilled
all of its obligations under the mortgage agreement. A non-performing mortgage is one
in which the borrower has not fulfilled its obligations under the mortgage agreements.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See idL
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See Jacob & Duncan, supra note 1, at 492.
94. See Ciochetti & Riddiough, supra note 84, at 67.
[Vol. 1
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transactions."5 However, when considering whether to borrow from a
lender who will securitize the commercial real estate loan, the bor-
rower must weigh the relative benefits of this type of borrowing
against more traditional commercial real estate financing.
There are numerous benefits to borrowing from a CMBS lender
as opposed to receiving financing from a traditional lender. The
benefits include non-recourse loans, lower transactional costs, avail-
ability of financing, and potentially lower interest rate financing.
However, the merging of securities and commercial real estate
law can lead to difficulties. Since the commercial mortgages to be
securitized will be pooled and eventually sold to investors, the bor-
rower/lender relationship in this context is different than in
traditional commercial real estate transactions. In the traditional
commercial real estate financing situation, lenders review loan re-
quests from the perspective of how the loan will perform in the
lender's loan portfolio.97 Since the individual commercial real estate
loan is viewed as an individual transaction, the lender has greater
flexibility in negotiating the terms of the loan. As a result of the this
flexibility, borrowers expect to negotiate the terms of their commer-
cial real estate loans. However, CMBS requires that the individual
commercial real estate loan be viewed not as an individual transac-
tion, but rather as part of an aggregated number of commercial real
estate loans that will be joined with other commercial real estate
loans to create a pool for securitization. This means that there is
much less flexibility for the lender to negotiate specific terms of the
loan. Thus, the borrower foregoes the ability to negotiate every term
95. Both transactions use mortgage documents, loan commitments, deeds of trust,
loan agreements, promissory notes, assignments of leases and rents, subordination, non-
disturbance and attornment agreements, as well as third party reports such as
environmental reports and engineering and structural reports and appraisals.
96. Non-recourse loans are loans where the lender does not look to the borrower in
case of default. Rather, the lender looks only to the collateral securing the loan for full
satisfaction of the indebtedness. Although it is one of the most important advantages, if
not the primary advantage, to borrowers, the non-recourse nature of the loan is not ab-
solute. Generally, a lender maintains recourse against a borrower for environmental
liabilities arising from the commercial real estate and for fraud, or any other type of mis-
representation on the part of the borrower. This is in contrast to a traditional commercial
real estate loan where lenders maintain recourse against the borrower for any problems,
especially default, that arise under the loan.
97. In the traditional setting, a commercial real estate lender (generally either a bank
or a insurance company) held on to the loan as part of a portfolio of loans made by the
lender. The lender used the loan as a revenue generating mechanism in the hopes of
making a profit on each loan in its loan portfolio.
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of the loan.
For instance, under the terms of the loan agreement, borrowers
are prohibited from prepaying principal." The prohibition or limita-
tion on principal prepayment may exist even in the event of casualty
or condemnation of the mortgaged property." This is not normally
the case in most traditional commercial real estate mortgages."®
However, since CMBS investors expect a steady, predictable cash
flow, prepayment of principal would disrupt that cash flow.' The
prepayment of principal would also place the CMBS investor in the
undesired position of accepting unwanted reinvestment risk."°2
Another CM3S issue is the need to ensure that the potential
bankruptcy of the borrower does not leave the commercial real estate
securing the loan susceptible to the potential claims of the borrower's
creditors.' °3 The borrower must create a special purpose vehicle
(SPV) that is a separate legal entity from the borrower."M The SPV's
only role must be to borrow money from the lender. 5 The SPV can
have no other creditor, unless otherwise permitted by the lender."
Without the use of the SPV, the potential liabilities of the borrower
from other businesses or properties make the property securing the
loan more susceptible to bankruptcy risk.07 If an SPV is not used as
the borrower, a bankruptcy filing by the borrower would, in the very
least, entail an automatic stay and disrupt the cash flow from the
property to the CMBS investor.
7 0
Furthermore, since the interest rates for the commercial real es-
tate loans are directly tied to Treasury obligations, the potential
interest rate constantly fluctuates. Therefore, the interest rate for the
98. See Joseph Philip Forte, From Main Street to Wall Street: Commercial Mortgage-
Backed Securities, 10 PROB. & PROP. 8, 13 (1996). The borrower may be allowed to make
principal prepayments, but severe principal prepayment penalties will likely be assessed.
For all practical purposes, the penalties act as an effective curtailment on the prepayment
of principal.
99. See iL at 13. Furthermore, in the event of casualty or condemnation, the bor-
rower may be required to restore the property with insurance proceeds or a
condemnation award. See id. at 13-14.
100. See id. at 14.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 14.
103. See id. at 13.
104. See iL
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.; 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
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loan is not fixed until the last moment. Unfortunately, this means
that borrowers will not know the exact interest rate until the end of
the process. This is much later than with traditional commercial real
estate financing.'09 However, this allows lenders to better manage
their interest rate risk. The time between the point at which the loan
interest rate is fixed and the point at which the loan is closed is very
short. This ensures that the lender has minimal exposure to interest
rate fluctuation risk, and allows the lender to hedge' its interest rate
risk by trading the appropriate hedge investment instrument.
These issues, along with the need to keep each of the loans
within the pool as similar as possible," ' leave less room for the bor-
rower to negotiate the loan documents than they would have with a
traditional commercial real estate loan. Borrowers must recognize
the trade-off before considering involvement in commercial real es-
tate loans that will be securitized.
V. THE COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITY OFFERING
The mechanics of the security offering for commercial mortgage
backed securities are straight-forward, although there may be unique
issues that face CMBS offerings. Generally, all offers and sales of
securities are subject to the registration requirements of section 5 of
the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act),"2 subject to applicable ex-
emptions provided in Section 3 and Section 4 of the 1933 Act.113 The
109. For example, if a borrower is using the loan transaction to refinance in order to
raise capital to satisfy a balloon payment obligation on an existing mortgage, then the
borrower needs a specific dollar amount to satisfy the payment due. If, due to fluctuating
Treasury rates, the refinancing does not generate sufficient capital to satisfy the balloon
payment, the borrower must find additional capital to satisfy the mortgage obligation. In
the traditional commercial real estate loan transaction, the borrower's interest rates are
more commonly tied to the prime rate. There is much less daily volatility in prime rate,
but there is constant change in the Treasury rates due to the activity of the secondary
market.
110. Hedging is a strategy that offsets investment risk by eliminating the possibility of
future gain or loss. See BARRON'S DICIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS
237 (4th ed. 1995). Since lenders in CMBS transactions use the interest rates on Treasury
obligations as the benchmark for the interest rates they quote to borrowers, the lenders
must engage in a hedge transaction to eliminate the risk of future Treasury rate fluctua-
tions.
111. The loans in the pool are kept similar to instill confidence in the rating agencies
and the investors that the loans in the pool have the same obligations to perform and pen-
alties for nonperformance.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1994); see Randal A. Nardone, Commercial Mortgage Loan Se-
curities, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIZATION 1993, at 61, 67 (PLI Real Est. L. &
1997]
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goal of the federal securities laws is to ensure fair and full disclosure
of information regarding the security and the issuer so that the rea-
sonable investor can determine the relative merits of the security."4
Under the 1933 Act, there is a private placement exemption un-
der Section 4(2)."' This section exempts from the 1933 Act's
registration requirements transactions that do not involve a public
offering."6 The private placement offering under Section 4(2) of the
1933 Act applies to offerings to qualified institutional investors.7 that
are "sufficiently sophisticated and have sufficiently strong bargaining
position that they do not need the protection of the federal registra-
tion requirement.. '".. By allowing the institutional investors to
purchase CMBS without prior registration, the efficiency and liquid-
ity of the private market may increase, allowing more CMBS
transactions to take place." 9 Regardless of the applicability of the
Section 4(2) private placement exemption under the 1933 Act, Sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act)'20
Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4442 1993).
114. See Richard E. Mendales, We Can Work It Out The Interaction Of Bankruptcy
And Securities Regulation In The Workout Context, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1211, 1257-58
(1994).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Structured Finance: The
New Way To Securitize Assets, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 607, 632 (1990).
116. See Nardone, supra note 113, at 73.
117. Qualified institutional investors are entities "that in aggregate own[] and investli
on a discretionary basis at least $100 million in securities of issuers that are not affiliated
with the entity." 2 TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURE FINANCING,
FINANCIAL ASSETS POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES § 12.16, at 26 (1st ed. 1991)
(quoting Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1)(i) (1997)).
118. 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
251 (3d ed. 1995). For most CMBS private placement transactions, the investors are insti-
tutional investors. The private placement exemption also applies to qualified individual
investors. See iL at 251. Rule 144A allows statutorily defined institutional investors to
purchase securities under the private placement exemption without requiring them to
comply with the two year holding period prior to resale of the security as long as resale is
to statutorily qualified institutional investors. See 1 HAZEN, supra, at 302. The adoption
of Rule 144A and the resulting ability of qualified institutional investors to resell com-
mercial mortgage backed securities purchased in a private placement transaction
increases the liquidity of the investment. See Shenke & Colletta, supra note 4, at 1408.
While Rule 144A places no restrictions on the resale of the security, the investor reselling
the security must take "reasonable steps to ensure that the purchaser is aware that the
seller may rely on the exemption from the provisions of section 5 if the [1933] Act pro-
vided by this section." 2 FRANKEL, supra note 117, § 12.16, at 29 (quoting Rule 144A, 17
C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(2) (1997)).
119. See 2 FRANKEL, supra note 117, § 12.16, at 25.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (1994).
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and the corresponding Rule 10b-5121 anti-fraud provisions apply.
12
Liability would exist for both exempt transactions and non-exempt
offerings if the SPV used "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud"
or if it made "any untrue statement of a material fact or [omitted] to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading. ,, 2'
If the CMBS transaction is a public offering, then the filing must
comply with the requirements of the 1933 Act. Under the 1933 Act,
the public offering of commercial mortgage backed securities are
most commonly issued through shelf offerings, which require regis-
tration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 4 Shelf
registration is permitted under Rule 415 of the 1933 Act." Shelf
registration allows for the registration of securities that will be pub-
licly offered on a delayed or continuing basis. 26 Shelf registrations
allow for the filing of the registration statement without the offering
or sale of all the securities registered."V
Offerings made with a shelf registration are used because of the
interest rate risk associated with the length of time required to as-
semble a pool of commercial real estate mortgages." The shelf
registration process allows the issuer to satisfy the registration re-
quirements of the 1933 Act at the same time as it acquires the
commercial mortgages to be pooled.1 29 When the commercial real
estate mortgages are assembled and pooled, the registration re-
quirements have already been met and the interest rate risk has been
averted.1 O
121. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996).
122. See Schwarcz, supra note 115, at 634.
123. Id. at 634 (quoting SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5).
124. See Nardone, supra note 113, at 72-73.
125. See id. at 72; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1996).
126. See Nardone, supra note 113, at 72.
127. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 118, at 176.
128. See 2 FRANKEL, supra note 117, § 12.18, at 38.
129. See 2 id.
130. See 2 id. at 38-39. The interest rate risk discussed here is the risk that without the
use of shelf registration the registration process might take too long. See 2 id. at 38. This
is problematic because commercial mortgage backed securities are very interest rate sen-
sitive instruments. See 2 id. Because of the constant fluctuations in the Treasury market,
the benchmark setting interest rates in CMBS transaction, a long registration period
would require the issuer to assume greater interest rate risk. See 2 id.
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However, the use of shelf registration requires the issuer to up-
date the registration statement in order to reflect accurate and
current information."' Any update is made by an amendment to the
registration statement which is deemed to be a new registration
statement for purposes of liability under the 1933 Act. 32
The registration statement is basically a disclosure statement
filed with the SEC.33 Disclosure of the risks associated with the in-
vestment is at the heart of the registration process. Since most
CMBS offerings are issued through the use of shelf registration, full
disclosure in compliance with the 1933 Act in the Statutory Prospec-
tus 34 and the Supplemental Prospectus 135 is essential. Liability can
arise if the disclosures would have misled a reasonable investor about
risks of the investment."3
The issuer must ensure that statements made in the prospectus
and other registration statement filings "are not materially mislead-
ing in light of the total mix of information available to the
investor."'37 The prospectus must accurately represent the invest-
ment strategy and provide sufficient explanation of the risks involved
with the investment. 38 The prospectus must be read as a whole and
the representations made in the prospectus, when taken together,
must not mislead a reasonable investor about the investment risks.139
If a prospectus "does not disclose material objective factual matters
or buries those matter[s] beneath other information, or treats them
cavalierly" then the prospectus violates the federal securities laws."
Even if a prospectus identifies and includes cautionary language
a court could disregard the warnings as boilerplate language insuffi-
131. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 118, at 179-80.
132. See 1 id. at 180.
133. See I id. at 122.
134. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j (1996). The prospectus used at the time of the initial
filing.
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)(3) (1996). The amended prospectus that reflects all current
and accurate information as of the time of the filing of the amendment.
136. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 118, at 173.
137. lid. at 174.
138. See Olkey v. Hyperion 1999 Term Trust, Inc., 98 F.3d 2, 3 (2d Cir. 1996). In
Olkey, Hyperion was offering a closed end mutual fund, whereas the typical CMBS trans-
action is structured as a pass-through certificate. See iL Hyperion was investing in
mortgage backed securities. See id. Although, the investment instrument used by Hype-
rion differed from the typical CMBS transaction, the disclosure requirements are the
same.
139. See id. at 5.
140. Id.
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cient to satisfy the disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act.'41 Boiler-
plate language can best be described as language that is "too generic
to take seriously."'42 While courts have found general language of
risk sufficient to ensure that the cautionary language of the prospec-
tus is not deemed boilerplate, the prospectus' warnings of the
investment's risk should be extensive and detailed.143
As additional protection, courts have adopted the "bespeaks
caution doctrine," which holds that cautionary language about the
investment risk may be sufficient to preclude liability arising from
individual misstatements or omissions in connection with projections
and estimates made by the issuer.1" The "bespeaks caution doctrine"
focuses on the total mix of information available to the investor when
determining if misstatements or omissions are material.45 Ulti-
mately, "[i]n order for the bespeaks caution doctrine to justify the
dismissal of fraud claims, the cautionary language must be sufficient
to negate any reasonable reliance on predictions that may appear op-
timistic."146
The goal of the disclosure requirement of the 1933 Act is to pro-
tect reasonable investors from being misled about the risks associated
with the investment. As long as the prospectus contains no material
misstatements or omissions of facts and the cautionary language is
not so generic as to be deemed boilerplate, then the prospectus will
accurately represent the investment strategy and provide sufficient
explanation of the risks involved with the investment. As such, a
prospectus of this sort should not create liability for the issuer.
VI. CHALLENGES FACED BY THE CMBS MARKET
In order to create a viable CMBS market, a number of chal-
lenges need to be confronted. The challenges are as follows: (1)
dealing with the non-fungibility of commercial real estate and the
homogenization of commercial real estate financial structures;'47
141. See id.
142. Id. at 8.
143. See id.
144. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 118, at 173-74.
145. See 1id, at 174.
146. 1 id. at 174-75.
147. See Sally Gordon, A Compelling Case for Commercial Real Estate Securitization,
Mortgage-Backed Securities Letter No. 39, Sept. 26, 1994, available in 1994 WL 2546170
(IAC Newsletter Database). For further discussion, see infra notes 151-86 and accompa-
nying text.
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(2) defining the role of the rating agencies and the loan servicer;148
and (3) creating structures that were isolated and independent. The
structures were needed to protect the underlying assets from the po-
tential bankruptcy risk of the former asset owners.149 This section
explores in broad terms the CMBS market's response to these chal-
lenges.
A. Non-Fungibilty"5 '
Investors' concerns about the non-fungibility of commercial real
estate were diminished with the realization that it was the cash flows
of the commercial property that were being securitized.5 ' For CMBS
investors, the consistency and predictability of the income stream
created by the mortgage payments mattered most, and the differ-
ences in the real estate assets securing the mortgages became less
important.152 Since it was not the underlying real estate that was be-
ing securitized, but rather the cash flow produced by that real estate,
the real estate securitized became fungible.'53 This allowed investors
to cast off traditional notions of commercial real estate investing and
find the value of the commercial real estate security in the cash flow
generated by the property."M The investment analysis focused on the
cash flow generating a reasonable return on the investment instead of
focusing on the potential sale of the property as the vehicle generat-
ing the return on investment.155
B. Homogenization of Commercial Real Estate Finance Structures
Generally, the financing structure and terms of individual com-
mercial real estate mortgages varied widely, as did the criteria used
148. See Commercial MBS: Service On The Mind, Mortgage-Backed Securities Letter
No. 9, Nov. 20, 1995, available in 1995 WL 9893496 (IAC Newsletter Database); see also
Howard A. Zuckerman, Stacey Berger Discusses the Expanding Role of Servicer and
CMBS Transactions, CAPITAL SOURCES FOR REAL ESTATE, Sept. 1995, at 10. For fur-
ther discussion, see infra notes 187-215 and accompanying text.
149. See Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 15, at 529; see infra notes 216-44
and accompanying text.
150. Non-fungibility of commercial real estate simply means that one commercial real
estate project cannot be replaced by another commercial real estate project. See Gordon,
supra note 148.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
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by lenders to qualify commercial real estate borrowers.'56 This raised
concerns that each commercial real estate loan transaction differed
so greatly that these loans may not have been amenable to pooling.'
The need to make these loans more amenable to pooling by cre-
ating more uniformity in the loan origination function was driven by
the growing CMBS market for predictability and consistency.' In
1994, approximately $20 billion in CMBSs were issued. 9 In 1995,
over $18 billion in CMBSs were issued with $8 billion coming in the
final quarter."16 Due to the increasing volume of CMBS and the ma-
turing nature of the CMBS market, the lending interest rate spreads
over the Treasury rate narrowed and provided lower interest cost to
borrowers. 6' However, this also meant that the potential return for
CMBS investors was also narrowing. Thus, uniformity in the origina-
tion documentation became important because CMBS investors need
to be able to analyze the risks of each loan in the securitization pool
as well as the risks of each CMBS transaction as an investment in-
strument. Currently, no standardized documentation to securitize
commercial real estate loans exists.
In 1996, representatives of the Mortgage Bankers Association of
America, National Association of Realtors, the National Realty
Committee, and members of the legal, financial, and investment
community, created the Capital Consortium to begin establishing
"common parameters and documentation" for CMBS.'62 The consor-
tium's goal was to create a standard for the marketplace by 1999.6
The consortium focused on four areas of CMBS: first, the develop-
ment of template documentation for the loan transaction in CMBS;'
second, the creation of a due diligence checklist to be used to identify
specific information that will assist in expediting the loan transac-
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See Alvin L. Arnold, Mortgage Securities: CMBS Market Review, Mortgage &
Real Est. Executives Rep. No. 3, Apr. 1, 1996.
160. See id.
161. See id. Generally, loan originators for CMBS use the interest rate of Treasury
obligations as the benchmark by which they set their lending interest rates.
162. Consortium Set Guidelines for CMBS, Mortgage-Back Securities Letter No. 27,
July 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8090821 (IAC Newsletter Database) [hereinafter Con-
sortium Sets].
163. See id.
164. See id. For further discussion, see infra notes 170-81 and accompanying text.
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tion;1'65 third, the creation of data collections and information guide-
lines;"6 and fourth, the establishment of a public policy initiative to
facilitate regulatory and legislative change in order to facilitate
CMBS.167
The mortgage template developed by the Capital Consortium is
a generic form to be used as a guide for securitizing commercial real
estate transactions." The template was not developed to create a
standard mortgage document. 169 The template was created to facili-
tate securitization of commercial real estate debt, thereby creating
greater liquidity and efficiency in the secondary market.1 70 In addi-
tion, the mortgage template should also facilitate the underwriting,
the origination, and the pooling of loans intended to be securitized17 1
The Capital Consortium's mortgage template hopes to promote
uniformity and structural consistency in capital market commercial
real estate transactions by organizing the documents in a more stan-
dardized way.17 This standard approach offers key information for
credit rating analysis purposes and for investment decisioumaking by
interested third parties who are trying to compare transactions."
The template is designed to achieve five purposes.'74 First, the tem-
plate attempts to standardize the location of provisions so that
relevant sections of the document can be readily located and re-
viewed by interested parties. 75 Second, the template attempts to
identify certain standard clauses that can be deleted by the parties if
165. See Consortium Sets, supra note 162. For further discussion, see infra notes 182-
84 and accompanying text.
166. See infra note 185 and accompanying text. The data and information guidelines
will assist in standardizing like information by data fields. Further, it will require updat-
ing procedures so that the investing community has sufficient information. This will
create a more efficient market. See Consortium Sets, supra note 162.
167. See infra note 186 and accompanying text; see also Consortium Sets, supra note
162.
168. See THE CAPITAL CONSORTIUM, CAPITAL MARKETS INITIATIVES, at Caveat
(June 1996).
169. See id. at 7.
170. See id.
171. See id. at ii (referring to a letter from the Capital Consortium Steering Commit-
tee).
172. See id. at 2.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id. Generally, the interested parties are rating agencies and potential inves-
tors.
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116they are inappropriate for specific real estate transactions. Third,
the template provides space for inserting appropriate and necessary
state-specific clauses relating to real property legal issues." Fourth,
the template attempts to establish certain basic, universal concepts
that are utilized in CMBS loan transactions.17" Finally, the template
attempts to "outline material aspects of mortgage loans for users
when they initially prepare the documents."'79 However, the mort-
gage template is not geared toward overly complicated and complex
commercial real estate transactions that may require traditionally
negotiated documents due to the nature of the specific commercial
real estate transaction."
In addition, the Capital Consortium created a Due Diligence
Checklist to insure that all information required for the loan transac-
tion is located within the loan document file."'1 The goal of the Due
Diligence Checklist is to provide a simple recording method that in-
sures all the required information is included in the loan document
file.' The Due Diligence Checklist is expected to "ease review of
loan document files, thereby expediting transaction execution. '
The Capital Consortium created Data Elements Guidelines
"aim[ed] at providing a comprehensive, uniform data framework for
issuers, investment bankers, loan servicers and investors to better
manage information at the security, class, pool, loan, property and
tenant levels."'  Finally, the National Public Policy and Initiatives
Update "focus[es] on identifying and monitoring public policy issues
affecting the short and long term flow of both debt and equity capital
into the commercial real estate sector."1 5
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See idt These universal concepts include a covenant to pay debt, a grant of secu-
rity interest in the collateral, certain representations and warranties, and other standard
legal issues, in addition to mechanical aspects of the loan transaction such as method of
payment. See id.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 7.
181. See id. at 2.
182- See id
183. Id.
184. Id at 3.
185. Id. at 85.
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C. Role of Rating Agencies
In 1985, the development of the CMBS market was greatly as-
sisted by the national credit rating agencies"' implementation of a
credit rating system for commercial mortgages."' By extending credit
ratings to commercial real estate transactions, the rating agencies
made the existence of a secondary market more feasible. Credit rat-
ings" for CMBS allowed investors to compare commercial mortgage
backed securities to corporate debt securities based on the ratings
awarded to each.'" The rating agencies rated the creditworthiness of
the issuer and the likelihood of repayment of the debt in much the
same manner as they rated corporate debt securities."9 Thus, the
highest rated commercial mortgage backed security could be com-
pared to the highest rated corporate bond or other similarly rated
instrument."" Furthermore, credit ratings allowed lending by nontra-
ditional investors who either lacked real estate expertise or whose
investment strategy limited their investing to only rated debt obliga-
tions.'
D. Role of the Loan Servicer
Securitization requires that the commercial real estate loans in
the pool be monitored to ensure that each borrower is in compliance
186. Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investors Services, Duff & Phelps, and Fitch Inves-
tors Services are national credit rating agencies that rate commercial mortgage backed
securities.
187. See Shenke & Colletta, supra note 4, at 1401. The first rating, done in 1985, was
for a single property commercial financing; thereafter, in 1987, the first pool of commer-
cial real estate loans was rated. See id These credit rating agencies had been assigning
credit ratings to residential mortgages since 1975. See hi For rating residential mortgage
pools, the agencies developed a statistical analytic method that allowed them to evaluate
the cash flow generated by the pool of residential mortgages, rather than basing their
credit rating on the collateral value of the underlying residential property in the pool or
evaluating the credit rating of the issuer. See id. The development of the credit rating
criteria for commercial real estate financing was based upon the same credit rating meth-
odology developed for residential mortgages. See id. at 1401-02. This is more the case
when the rating agencies were evaluating a pool of commercial real estate transactions.
In the case of single property specific transactions the rating agencies evaluate the prop-
erty on the individual aspects of the specific property: the property's rent roll, appraisal
value, and other real estate underwriting criteria more common to traditional commercial
real estate lenders. See id. In addition, as part of their analysis, the rating agencies look
at the bankruptcy remoteness of the issuer as well as other real estate issues relating to
title and property of the mortgage securing the property. See i
188. See id. at 1401.
189. See Richards, supra note 4, at 114.
190. See id.
191. See Shenke & Colletta, supra note 4, at 1401-02.
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with the loan terms. The duty to monitor compliance with the terms
of each commercial real estate loan in the pool falls upon the loan
servicer.92 The loan servicer may be either a third party or the trans-
feror (sometimes called the seller-servicer). 93 There are two types of
loan servicers: master servicers and special servicers.9'
The master servicer is responsible for the commercial real estate
loans that substantially comply with the terms of the loan agree-
ments. The master servicer collects payments in satisfaction of the
installment payment obligation of the borrower and remits those
funds to the SPV for the benefit of the CM1BS investors.9 The mas-
ter servicer also advances capital to cover any shortfall that arises
from borrower delinquencies.'96 If there are payment shortfalls from
any of the commercial real estate loans, either due to delinquencies
or loan defaults, the master servicer provides sufficient capital to en-
sure that the investors are paid.'97 Furthermore, the master servicer
advances capital to pay for items such as property taxes and assess-
ments and insurance premiums."'
In addition, the master servicer monitors the changes in both the
cash flow of the commercial real estate and the market value of the
commercial real estate acting as collateral.' The master servicer
regularly reports to the investors, the underwriters and the rating
agencies the status of the loans, the cash flow of the properties, and
the market value of the property.2" The reports also include informa-
tion such as site inspections, property operating statements, rent rolls,
and financial and market information.20'
192. See Zuckerman, supra note 148, at 10.
193. See Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 15, at 548. However, if the
originator/transferor is the servicer, then concerns regarding the absolute transfer
through a true sale may arise. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
194. See Zuckerman, supra note 148, at 10.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See Zuckerman, supra note 148, at 10. Monitoring the changes is important for
two reasons. First, declines in the cash flows of the commercial real estate could affect
the ability of the borrower to satisfy the monthly installment payment obligations. Sec-
ond, reductions in the value of the commercial real estate acting as collateral would leave
less value supporting the indebtedness in case of default.
200. See id.
201. See iL
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The special servicer deals exclusively with non-performing
loans. 2 The special servicer is responsible for working out the non-
performing loan, and for managing and liquidating any properties
that have been foreclosed upon. 3
No standard, industry-wide formula for determining when a loan
moves from a delinquent loan status to a defaulting loan status ex-
ists0 4  The master servicers make this determination."' The
determination that a loan is no longer viable and that the advances
made by the master servicer on behalf of the delinquent loan are no
longer recoverable has great impact on the CMBS investor. When
such a determination is made, the loan is transferred to a special
servicer and the master servicer is no longer required to make capital
advances to cover shortfalls."' Therefore, for investors to receive any
return from the loan, they must wait for the special servicer to either
work-out or liquidate the non-performing loan.
In addition, both master and special servicers must be aware of
their fiduciary responsibilities. The loan services owe fiduciary duties
to the SPV and CMBS investors.27 The loan servicers should be
aware that conflicts may arise between classes of CMBS investors
that may make it hard to maintain their fiduciary responsibilities to
the different classes.0" Although not in a fiduciary relationship with
the loan servicers, the underwriters and the ratings agencies also rely
on the servicers for prompt and accurate information about the
CMBS transaction. Furthermore, because other parties also rely on
the loan servicer, the loan servicer may have greater difficulty main-
taining its fiduciary responsibility to the different classes of CMBS
investor.210 Loan servicers play an important role in the success of
202. See id Non-performing loans are loans in which the borrowers are delinquent
and need assistance to comply with the terms of the loan agreement or the borrowers are
considered to be in default.
203. See idL
204. See id.
205. See i
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id If different tranches receive different yields on their bonds, then the deci-
sions made by the master servicer may effect the sought after yields the investor expected
to receive. See id For example, the investors in each individual tranche may have con-
flicting interests when a delinquent loan is determined to be a defaulting loan and
transferred to the special servicer. See id.
209. See idt
210. See id.
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each CMBS transaction and an important role in the ongoing success
of CMBS in general.
E. Bankruptcy Remoteness
Securitization serves many important functions, including the
protection of assets from the potential bankruptcy of the asset origi-
nator/transferor.211 The structure of a commercial real estate
securitization requires that the loan pool be transferred on an abso-
lute basis to a legally separate entity, the SPV.212 The SPV's activities
are limited to acquiring the assets to be securitized and selling inter-
ests in the assets.2 3 In its most basic and straightforward design, the
SPV receives (through a "true sale"214) the assets to be securitized
from the originator/transferor. 2'5 Once the SPV receives the assets,
the SPV raises funds from third party investors either through debt
financing or through a sale of interests in the SPV itself.26 The capi-
tal contributions made by the third party investors are then delivered
to the originator/transferor as payment of the purchase price of the
assets transferred to the SPV.
217
The sale of the assets from the originator/transferor to the SPV
must be structured to create a "true sale" of the assets.218 To insure
that the transfer constitutes a "true sale" the originator/transferor
can have neither legal nor equitable interests in the assets to be secu-
ritized.1 9 In determining whether the transaction qualifies as a true
sale, courts generally consider whether five elements are satisfied.
First, and perhaps most important, the risk of loss arising from the
transferred assets must be sufficient to place the risk with the SPV,20
211. See Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 15, at 553.
212. See id. at 541. The SPV is the entity through which the securitization activities
take place. See id. at 533. The activities of the SPV are limited to financing matters. See
il.
213. See iL at 568.
214. See infra notes 225-34 and accompanying text.
215. See Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 15, at 567-68. The true sale re-
quirement is a matter of substance over form. See id. at 542.
216. See id. at 568.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 568.
219. See iL at 533.
220. See id at 543. The transfer of the risk of loss is measured by the amount of re-
course against the originator/transferor for losses suffered by the SPV. If there is
excessive recourse left with the originator/transferor, then the court may view the transfer
as a loan, not a sale. However, credit enhancement devices, such as letters of credit,
surety bonds, and subordinated interests, do not constitute excessive recourse sufficient to
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and there must be a fairly valued purchase paid for the transferred
assets."' Second, the originator/transferor cannot retain any benefits
of ownership of the transferred assets.' Any ability of the origina-
tor/transferor to capture an increase in the value of the transferred
assets would constitute a benefit of ownership.' Third, the origina-
tor/transferor cannot maintain any control over the transferred
assets."4 Fourth, the originator/transferor cannot continue to show
the transferred property on its own books.' Finally, the parties must
intend that the transfer be absolute.'
In addition, the transaction must be structured to minimize the
likelihood that the transferred assets will be consolidatede7 with the
originator/transferor's assets if the originator/transferor files for
bankruptcym Individual creditors of the separate entities existing
before consolidation can become joint creditors of the post-
consolidation debtor.29 Creditors seek to use consolidation to join
the unencumbered assets of an interrelated entity in order to increase
nullify the transfer. See id. at 543-46, 549-50.
221. See Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 15, at 546. If the consideration
paid for the transferred assets is overly discounted when compared to the market value of
the asset, a court may consider the transfer a fraudulent conveyance. See id. at 548.
222. See id. at 546.
223. See id.
224. See id. If the originator/transferor is acting as the loan servicer (sometimes called
a seller-servicer), it is important that its actions as servicer are consistent with an arms
length transaction. Otherwise, a court may determine that a true sale of the assets did not
exist, which would leave the SPV open to potential bankruptcy liability of the origina-
tor/transferor. See id. at 548. To ensure that the transaction is deemed an arms length
transaction: (1) the seller-servicer must receive a servicing fee from the SPV comparable
to a fee that a third party servicer would receive; (2) the SPV should have the ability to
revoke the servicing agreement with the seller-servicer as it would under the terms of an
agreement with a third party servicer; (3) all of the records of the seller-servicer should
identify the assets securitized as property of the SPV. See id. at 548-49. In addition, if a
seller-servicer must provide capital to cover any shortfall in income from the asset pool or
advance capital for the payment of expenses, then the seller-servicer must do so in a
manner consistent with the originator/transferor as seller-servicer, and not by accepting
any further credit risk for the assets in the pool. This is necessary so that the true sale
nature of the transfer is not lost, which would thereby leave the SPV open to potential
bankruptcy liability of the originator/transferor seller-servicer. See id. at 551.
225. See id. at 546-47.
226. See id. at 547.
227. Consolidation takes the assets and liabilities of separate entities (in this case the
originator/transferor and the SPV) and treats them as a single entity. See 4 J. STEPHEN
GILBERT & PHILIP J. HENDEL, CHAPTER 11 THEORY AND PRACrICE: A GUIDE TO
REORGANIZATION § 24.01 (James F. Queenan et al. eds., 1994).
228. See Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 15, at 533.
229. See 4 GILBERT & HENDEL, supra note 230, § 24.02.
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the assets from which the debtor can satisfy debt owed to its credi-
tors.' Consolidation would increase the asset pool from which the
debtor could repay the outstanding indebtedness to its creditors.
While there is no statutory authority for consolidation, bank-
ruptcy courts use their equitable power to consolidate the assets of
separate entities." ' The corporate veil may be pierced if the courts,
in their discretion, determine that the entities do not have distinct
independent existences.2
Finally, if a bank acts as an originator/transferor of the assets to
be securitized, there may be special issues to consider. 3 Since banks
fall outside normal bankruptcy proceedings, ' the structure of the
transfer must insure that the assets will not be available to satisfy an
insolvent bank's creditors. In bank insolvency, "no special power
exist[s] for creditors to reach the assets of [the] affiliates."' 5 If the
transfer is structured properly, an SPV, as a subsidiary, 6 should sat-
isfy the affiliate requirement and avoid the claims of the insolvent
bank's creditors.
VII. THE ROLE OF CMIBS IN NORTH CAROLINA
The impact of CMBS in the North Carolina banking community
has been mixed. For First Union and NationsBank, CMBS has be-
come important to their overall commercial real estate lending
strategies2 7 By contrast, the impact of CMBS on BB&T, CCB, Cen-
230. See 4 id. § 24.02.
231. See 4 id. § 24.03-.04.
232. See 4 iL § 24.03.
233. See generally Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42
DUKE L.J. 469 (1992) (noting that the increase of bank insolvencies during the 1980s gave
rise to greater power for regulatory agencies in dealing with insolvent banks).
234. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (1994) (stating that banks are not debtors for the pur-
pose of the applicability of the Bankruptcy code).
235. Swire, supra note 233, at 482.
236. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 117, § 10.9, at 429-39.
237. The power of banks to securitize loans, such as commercial real estate loans, ap-
pears to conflict with certain prohibitions set forth in the Glass-Steagall Act. The Glass-
Steagall Act prohibits banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System from
"investing in, issuing, distributing, selling, trading in and underwriting securities, and from
being affiliated with an entity that engages in these activities." 2 FRANKEL, supra note
117, at § 16.4, at 139-40 & nn.1-4 (discussing the prohibitions set forth in the Glass-
Steagall Act and, in that respect, identifying the terms "member bank," "underwriting
securities," and "affiliated" (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(seventh), 221, 221a(b) (1994))). How-
ever, in 1989, the Second Circuit overturned a federal district court and held that the
determination of the Comptroller of the Currency to allow banks to use mortgage pass-
1997]
314 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 1
tura, and Wachovia has been nonexistent. First, this section explores
the strategies that First Union and NationsBank have adopted to in-
tegrate CMBS into their commercial real estate lending. Then, this
section analyzes why BB&T, CCB, Centura, and Wachovia have not
utilized CMBS for their investment portfolios.
A. First Union National Bank: First Union Capital Market?8
In June 1994, First Union decided to augment its traditional
commercial real estate lending by creating First Union Capital Mar-
kets Commercial Real Estate Finance group (CREF). CREF was
created to implement First Union's CMBS strategy. Initially, First
Union's strategy was to use CMBS to increase service to its existing
borrowers. 9
First Union believed that it might be placed at a competitive dis-
advantage if it did not provide CMBS services to its existing
customers. First Union was concerned that other financial institu-
tions might make commercial real estate loans secured by those "B"
and "C" properties that First Union, using its traditional credit risk
analysis, would not make.' Although first viewed as an attempt to
service its existing commercial real estate customers, First Union's
entrance into CMBS quickly expanded beyond this initial strategy.
CREF now acts as a profit center for First Union in two ways: by
earning fees for originating the loans24 and by earning money from
CMBS sales.242
through certificates did not violate the Glass-Steagall Act. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 885 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1989). See generally 2 FRANKEL, supra
note 117, at §§ 16.4 to 16.5, at 139-48 (discussing the interplay between CMBS and the
Glass-Steagall Act). A more complete discussion of the Glass-Steagall Act is outside the
scope of this Comment.
238. Interview with Lawrence A. Brown, Senior Vice President and Managing Direc-
tor of First Union Capital Markets Commercial Real Estate Finance, in Charlotte, N.C.
(Jan. 3, 1997).
239. First Union believed that many of its "A" quality real estate borrowers had "B"
and "C" type commercial real estate that needed financing. First Union also believed
that with CMBS they could make loans secured by "B" and "C" commercial real estate
without assuming the risk of placing "B" and "C" commercial real estate property into
the bank's real estate loan portfolio. Loans secured with "B" and "C" commercial real
estate posed a greater default risk than was acceptable.
240. This might have put First Union at risk of losing their customers to other institu-
tions that were willing to assist borrowers on higher risk assets. Those customers, who
received financing elsewhere, might reward the lender who was willing to accept the
credit risk for loans secured by "B" and "C" property by moving the rest of their business.
241. It is less likely that CREF would earn origination fees on loans originated by third
party correspondents.
242. When CREF makes loans to borrowers, depending on the length of the loan,
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In 1996, CREF closed approximately $1.5 billion worth of com-
mercial real estate loans for securitization. Approximately one third
of the loans were generated by CREF itself, approximately one third
were generated by third party correspondents for CREF, and ap-
proximately one third were generated by intrabank correspondents
responsible for origination of loans within specified territories of the
First Union banking system.243 In addition, CREF was involved with
two CMBS offerings with Merrill Lynch. First Union and Merrill
Lynch pooled their commercial real estate loans and their distribu-
tion network in the combined offerings.
CREF has concentrated its efforts in conduit CMBS transac-
tions2" closing loans that are pooled and then securitized. In addition
to the geographic diversification created by its origination strategy,
CREF makes loans on diverse types of property. CREF's commer-
cial real estate loans include, but are not limited to, multi-family
residential property, retail commercial property, industrial real es-
tate, office real estate, health care related property, hotels, and
mobile home parks.
CREF has also begun to make loans in the specialized area of
Credit Tenant Leases (CTL). The CTL program makes loans on in-
CREF uses Treasury obligations of corresponding length plus a negotiated spread on
basis points above the Treasury obligations to determine the appropriate interest rate on
the loan. Once the loan interest rates are locked in, CREF must hedge against interest
rate fluctuation by trading Treasury obligations. Once the loans are pooled, CREF cre-
ates investment tranches with the goal of dividing the pool into as large a percentage of
AAA pieces as possible and as small a percentage of unrated pieces as possible. The
larger the percentage of higher rate tranches that can be carved out of the loan pool, the
lower aggregate interest rate the CMBS conduit will have to pay to investors. CREF
makes money by reducing the aggregate interest paid to investors while attempting to
achieve the highest possible aggregate interest paid by borrowers. Treasury obligations
are used as a baseline, and the measure of interest rates is the basis points over the
Treasury obligations at the time the loans were made and the basis points over the Treas-
ury obligations at the time the CMBS bonds were sold. By using Treasury obligations as a
baseline, the hedging activity of CREF becomes essential for CREF to maintain its de-
sired basis point spread over Treasury obligations.
243. Currently, First Union has six intrabank correspondents covering Tennessee,
North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Virginia, Maryland, the District of Columbia, and the
Northeast United States.
244. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text. Conduit transactions offer the
greatest possible diversity of loans to potential CMBS investors, thereby lessening in-
vestment risk. The pool is diversified by the geographic location of the commercial real
estate property and by the type of commercial property included in the pool. The CREF
loan origination mechanism allows it the opportunity to close loans from all geographic
regions within the United States. The intrabank correspondents focus on the creation of
loans within their specific geographic region, while CREF and third party correspondents
attempt to originate loans from all geographic regions of the United States.
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dividual real estate parcels where the lease obligations are guaran-
teed by corporations with investment grade credit ratings. The focus
of CTL is not only on the cash flow generated by the property itself
but also on the creditworthiness of the lease guarantor. Because this
is such a unique type of commercial real estate loan, CREF plans to
pool its CTL loans separately from other commercial loans and offer
a CMBS transaction containing only CTL loans.
Finally, CREF concentrates its lending activity on loans between
$1 million and $25 million. This loan size minimizes the potential
impact of a small number of loan defaults. The impact of a default is
reduced because no one loan represents a disproportionate percent-
age of a $500 million to $1 billion pool.
First Union's entry into the CMBS market created another profit
center for the bank while allowing it to satisfy its overall commercial
real estate strategy. This success should guarantee First Union's con-
tinued participation in the CMBS market.
B. NationsBank: NationsBanc Capital Markets245
NationsBank and its predecessors experienced large commercial
real estate loan losses due in part to acquisitions of failing institutions
that faced large commercial real estate write-offs. Securitization of
commercial real estate loans allows NationsBank to remain active in
commercial real estate lending while, in large part, eliminating com-
mercial real estate risk. Furthermore, CMBS enables NationsBank
to capitalize on its relationships with borrowers.
NationsBank is one of the largest commercial real estate lenders
in the country, originating between $7.5 billion and $10 billion worth
of loans each year. In 1996, NationsBank securitized approximately
$1.4 billion of commercial real estate and securitized an additional
$800 million from its credit-backed mortgage program.26 Nations-
Bank has adopted a broad approach toward participation in the
CMBS market and has focused on differing types of commercial real
estate. NationsBank has securitized loans on multifamily residential
245. Interview with Kenneth A. Rivkin, Managing Director, Commercial Mortgage
Trading, NationsBanc Capital Market Real Estate Finance, in Charlotte, N.C. (Jan. 20,
1997).
246. The credit-backed mortgage program makes loans on individual real estate par-
cels where the lease obligations are guaranteed by corporations with investment grade
credit ratings. The credit-backed mortgage program is not only on the cash flow gener-
ated by the property itself, but also on the creditworthiness of the lease guarantor.
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and commercial real estate,'47 Section 42 property,2' credit-backed
mortgages, distressed real estate '9 through conduit transactions, and
single asset transactions.2
NationsBank has divided the responsibilities for its CMBS pro-
gram into two distinct functions: the distribution function and the
origination function. The distribution function handles the sale of
the CMBS product and the hedging activity of the real estate finance
group." The distribution function allows NationsBank discretion to
determine whether their CMBS offering should be sold through their
distribution system or in partnership with another distribution sys-
tem. The development of this independent distribution function
permits NationsBank to retain more of the sales fees generated by
their CMBS offerings.
Another important component of the distribution function is the
dissemination of NationsBank's investment analysis and reports to its
clients. The research generated by NationsBank assists clients in
evaluating investment opportunities available to them.
The origination function is responsible for the creation and
structuring of the commercial real estate loans for securitization. The
bank will originate loans between $1 million and $50 million per
transaction. NationsBank uses internal and external origination
sources for its CMBS product. Internally, the bank takes advantage
of its commercial banking network to refer potential commercial real
estate borrowers to the capital markets real estate finance origination
group. The real estate finance group of NationsBanc Capital Mar-
247. NationsBank classifies its commercial real estate programs into shopping centers
(strip centers and enclosed malls), industrial real estate, office real estate, and health care
related real estate, such as nursing homes.
248. The goal of Section 42 of the 1986 Budget Reform Act is to use tax credits rather
than direct government funding to encourage the construction, acquisition or rehabilita-
tion, and increased development of affordable housing for low income citizens. See
NATIONSBANK, N.A., COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE RESEARCH SECTION 42 LOANS 2
(1995); see also 26 U.S.C. § 42 (1994).
249. Distressed real estate is best described as non-performing real estate. The Reso-
lution Trust Corporation, which was established by Congress in response to the savings
and loan crisis, took the lead in the securitizing of distressed real estate. See NA-
TIONSBANK, supra note 248, at 2.
250. Single asset transactions is either the securitization of a single property or the
securitization of all the property of a single borrower. As an example of a single asset
securitization, in 1996 NationsBank securitized the 55 story class "A" office building in
Atlanta, Georgia, known as the NationsBank Plaza. See CSC ASSOCIATES, L.P.,
OFFERING CIRCULAR 5 (1996).
251. NationsBank believes that its distribution function area is equivalent to any sales
network established on Wall Street.
1997]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
kets also originates loans. These two sources serve as the internal
origination mechanism of the bank. In addition, the bank uses exter-
nal loan originators, 22 attempting to originate loans from all
geographic regions of the United States. These third party origina-
tors loan origination outside of NationsBank's commercial bank
network.
Participation in the CMBS market has been an extremely suc-
cessful strategy for NationsBank. CMBS allows NationsBank to
remain one of the largest loan originators in the United States with-
out assuming the credit risk associated with commercial real estate
loans, thus satisfying its strategic goal.
C. BB&T,23 CCB,2- Centura,25 Wachovia'
Although CMBS has become a viable alternative to traditional
commercial real estate lending for First Union and NationsBank,
other North Carolina banks have used CMBS neither as a lending
strategy' nor as an investment alternative for their investment port-
folios. 8 Not only have BB&T, CCB, Centura, and Wachovia chosen
not to originate CMBS, they have also opted not to invest in CMBS.
Currently, BB&T has approximately $5.5 billion in its invest-
ment portfolio.29 CCB has $1 billion in the bank's investment
portfolio, Centura has $1.4 billion in its investment portfolio, and
Wachovia has $8 billion in its investment portfolio.
252. According to Mr. Rivkin, the relationships between NationsBank and the third
party originators are either exclusive relationships or "semi-exclusive" relationships.
253. Telephone Interview with Gypsy McKenzie, Senior Vice President and Portfolio
Manager, Branch Banking & Trust Co. (Jan. 3, 1997).
254. Telephone Interview with Leo Pylypec, First Vice-President and Asset Liability
Manager, Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co. (Jan. 9, 1997).
255. Telephone Interview with Nat Siewers, Senior Investment Officer, Centura Bank
Co. (Jan. 10, 1997).
256. Telephone Interview with Michael G. Sebesta, Vice President and Portfolio Man-
ager, Wachovia National Bank & Trust Co. (Jan. 10, 1997).
257. These banks have not turned to CMBS because they do not generate sufficient
volume and diversification of commercial real estate loans to warrant a securitization
effort.
258. Outside of their investment portfolio, however, Mutual Funds or certain trust
investments managed by North Carolina banks may invest in CMBS. First Union and
NationsBank also may trade CMBS for customers as part of their investment bank activi-
ties. However, these inquiries are outside the scope of this Comment.
259. When the acquisition of United Carolina Bank is complete, BB&T will have over
$6.5 billion in its investment portfolio.
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The investment philosophy of these banks has been extremely
conservative. These banks are concerned about the preservation and
protection of capital, liquidity management, and interest rate risk
management when making investments for their respective invest-
ment portfolios. Two specific reasons explain why these banks do
not invest in CMBS for their investment portfolios. First, they are
concerned by the perceived lack of liquidity of the CMBS market.
These banks do not believe that commercial mortgage backed securi-
ties offer sufficient liquidity to satisfy the investment portfolio's
investment criteria.26
Second, these banks do not invest in CMBS because these banks
assign the responsibility of making determinations on real estate
credit risk to their respective loan portfolios and not to their invest-
ment portfolios. The banks view CMBS as commercial real estate
loans and they believe that the underlying credit risk for each indi-
vidual loan in the CMBS pool does not warrant the associated risk of
the investment. Furthermore, these banks have active commercial
loan operations that enjoy the expertise necessary to fully evaluate
commercial real estate loans that satisfy these institutions' credit cri-
teria. Instead of allowing the CMBS loan originator to determine the
potential for non-performance of the individual loans within the
CMBS pool, these banks would rather manage their own commercial
real estate lending. These banks do not want to assume the same risk
260. The concern about liquidity takes two forms. First, there is the concern about
yield liquidity in a stable market. While there are sufficient numbers of investors in the
secondary market willing to purchase bonds issued in a CMBS transaction, from the per-
spective of these banks, the market is not yet large enough to provide the yield liquidity
required by their investment criteria. For example, if a bank purchases a CMBS bond on
day one and wants to sell the bond in the secondary market on day two, assuming no fluc-
tuations in either interest rates or default rates that effect the value of the bond, the
concern of the banks is that the CMBS bond yield, which should remain the same as it was
when the bond was purchased, would fluctuate because the current size of the CMBS
market is not large enough to maintain stable yield pricing. These institutions compare
the AAA CMBS market to the more liquid Treasury market and Federal Agency market.
However, both the Treasury and Federal Agency markets are deemed large enough to
maintain stable yield pricing on the bonds issued.
Second, these banks are concerned about market value liquidity. Any change in the
real estate market, whether national or within a region will influence both the current
market value of the security and the liquidity of the security. If the banks were put into a
position of requiring the capital that they invested in commercial mortgage backed securi-
ties at a time when the securities market value was depressed, then the investing banks
would have to sell the security at a discount. The lack of yield stability and market value
liquidity does not fit the investment philosophy of preservation and protection of capital
required by these banks.
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in their investment portfolio that they assume in their loan portfolio.
For these banks, the costs associated with developing the exper-
tise to properly evaluate a CMBS investment, coupled with the
default and liquidity risks of CMBS, are not worth the additional in-
vestment risk.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although CMBS has become a viable lending strategy for First
Union and NationsBank, CMBS has not yet become a viable invest-
ment strategy for medium- and small-sized banks. The likelihood
that banks like BB&T, CCB, Centura, and Wachovia will invest in
CMBS is minute. The conservative investment philosophy of these
institutions combined with the availability of investments that offer
sufficient return do not make CMBS investing plausible.
The development of CMBS demonstrates the adaptability of the
law to facilitate new financing structures. With lending and legal in-
frastructures for CMBS established and the development of a
secondary market that has accepted CMBS, Commercial Mortgage
Backed Securitization is an additional source of commercial real es-
tate financing.
However, the long term impact of CMBS remains unclear. The
future success of CMBS depends upon the economic factors261 that
261. Mr. Brown of First Union and Mr. Rivkin of NationsBank offer differing views on
the potential impact the economy and the marketplace will have on the future of CMBS.
Brown's perspective is that the CMBS market will begin to face difficulties if the interest
rates for ten-year Treasury obligations exceeds eight percent. Brown divides his market
of potential borrowers into two main categories. First, there are those with real estate
who need to refinance. Second, there are those with real estate who want to refinance,
but who do not need to refinance.
The borrowers who need to refinance, need to do so for two possible reasons. Either,
they have an existing loan with a balloon payment coming due, or they want to do addi-
tional commercial real estate development and need the equity in their existing property
to finance that additional development.
Borrowers who want to refinance but who do not need to refinance are motivated ei-
ther by the current interest rate environment (offering the borrower a lower interest rate
than their existing loan) or by large amounts of equity in property that they want to real-
ize. The likelihood that potential borrowers will refinance is closely tied to prevailing
interest rates. Those borrowers who need to refinance, while still keenly aware of interest
rates, are also motivated by factors outside the interest rate calculation.
Brown believes that if the interest rates of ten year Treasury obligations exceed eight
percent, then there may be a concomitant chilling effect on the segment of the commer-
cial real estate market that wants to but does not need to refinance. For example, if a
CMBS lender's target is to offer interest rates to its borrowers at 250 basis points over a
ten year Treasury obligation that had a 8.5% interest rate, then that would correspond to
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determine whether CMBS is a worthwhile investment, rather than
upon legal factors. Although potential pitfalls exist, CMBS has
quickly become an important alternative to traditional sources of fi-
nancing in commercial real estate.
ALAN KRONOVETt
an 11 % CMBS interest rate. Since loans for securitization often have prepayment penal-
ties and prepayment lockout periods, an 11% interest rate for 10 years would present a
large long-term debt service burden on most commercial real estate property. Due to the
potentially large long-term debt service burden, CMBS loan origination might slow down.
Those borrowers who do not need loans are not likely to refinance. If that segment of the
potential pool of borrowers is removed, then the issuance of commercial mortgage backed
securities may also diminish.
Rivkin believes that market competition between lenders may create difficulty for
the CMBS market. Rivkin feels that, when traditional commercial real estate lenders
begin to view CMBS as a serious competitive threat to their commercial real estate lend-
ing business, they will respond in such a way as to make CMBS lending less attractive to
the borrower. One possible response would be a change in lending interest rates that
would require CMBS lenders to lower their interest rates. This decline in interest rates
would be reflected in diminished returns for potential investors in commercial mortgage
backed securities. Clearly, the lower the return for the potential investor, the less favor-
able an investment CMBS becomes.
The concerns raised by both Brown and Rivkin reflect the importance of loan origi-
nation in CMBS. If there is an insufficient volume of loans originated, then there will be a
paucity of commercial mortgage backed securities available for purchase by investors.
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